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Education and health care are the two largest government expenditure items in 
most developed economies. In  1991, total government  spending on primary 
and secondary education in the United States totaled $219 billion, and another 
$96 billion was spent on public colleges and universities. Educational outlays 
represent nearly 30% of government purchases of goods and services. Direct 
government health care spending totaled $3  16 billion, and another $60 billion 
of forgone revenue was attributable to deductions and exemptions of health- 
related items under the income tax. 
There are fundamental differences in the government’s role in the health and 
education sectors of the U.S. economy. State and local governments are the 
direct providers of the majority (92%) of primary and secondary educational 
services. The service providers  are government employees, with salaries  set 
through a partly political process, and decisions about methods of production 
such as classroom activities and curriculum are made by  quasi-political gov- 
ernment bureaucracies.  Competition between  alternative providers of educa- 
tional services occurs largely through competition between communities for 
potential residents. 
In health care, although federal, state, and local governments ultimately pay 
for more than 40% of health  outlays, they are direct providers of relatively 
little health care. While state and local governments operate some hospitals, 
and  the  federal government  administers  the  Veterans  Administration  (VA) 
medical network, most health care providers work in the private sector. Various 
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government programs and policies nevertheless substantially reduce the cost 
of medical care for many consumers. Medicare and Medicaid, the federal gov- 
ernment’s programs to provide health care services to the elderly and the indi- 
gent, are essentially tax-supported  systems of government payments for ser- 
vices provided in the private market. In addition, the current income tax code 
subsidizes medical  outlays by  households who are neither elderly  nor poor, 
thereby altering the price of health services. 
The contrast between public policies in these two markets raises a host of 
questions about the scope of government in a mixed economy. Even a cursory 
review of  current policies yields paradoxes. For example, why is most child 
care for preschoolers in the United States provided through a system of family 
and private market transactions, while primary and secondary education is pro- 
vided directly by the government? Why is the public  sector’s role in higher 
education substantially smaller than its role in elementary education? Why did 
the GI Bill, which provided health care and educational benefits for veterans 
of World War 11,  rely on a federal bureaucracy  (the VA)  to directly provide 
health care, while relying on a variant of a voucher system and private provid- 
ers with respect to education? Why does the federal government directly pro- 
duce health care services for veterans, while relying on private providers for 
those who receive benefits under Medicare and Medicaid? Why are there sub- 
stantial differences across localities in the degree of public versus private pro- 
vision of some services? 
These questions relate broadly to the “choice of instrument problem,” the 
question of how government should intervene in a market if such intervention 
is deemed necessary. Although public finance textbooks, such as Rosen (1992) 
and Stiglitz (1988), begin by explaining that market imperfections and redis- 
tributive considerations can justify government intervention in a market econ- 
omy, there is remarkably little discussion of what types of policies are justified. 
There is virtually no evidence on the empirical magnitudes of many of the key 
parameters needed to guide policy in these areas. Empirical evidence on the 
importance of potential  market imperfections, and the distributional  conse- 
quences of various interventions in the markets for education and health care 
services, is particularly scarce. Moreover, economic factors alone are unlikely 
to explain the observed structure of public policy, which is due in significant 
part to historical and political influences. 
This paper explores the “choice of instrument” problem with particular ap- 
plication to the markets for education and health care. It is divided into five 
sections. The first outlines the traditional market failure arguments that neo- 
classical economists marshal to support public intervention in private markets, 
and discusses the application of these arguments to education and health care. 
Section 10.2 explores the link between goals of redistributive justice and pub- 
lic policies in these areas. Both education and health care have been described 
as “basic rights” in some contexts, suggesting that these services should not be 
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Section 10.3  examines the comparative merits of three potential policy inter- 
ventions: price subsidies, including the special case of full public payment for 
purchases  in the private market; public  mandates for private provision;  and 
direct government provision. It highlights conditions under which each of these 
potential instruments will be successful in achieving particular  policy objec- 
tives, as well as situations in which each instrument  may fail. Section  10.4 
describes  the current structure and historical evolution of public policies  to- 
ward education and health care in the United States, and considers the degree 
to which the market imperfections and redistributive considerations described 
in the earlier sections can account for these policies. The concluding section 
outlines areas of uncertainty where further work is needed to evaluate alterna- 
tive policy instruments. 
10.1  Market Imperfections in the Markets for Education and 
Health Care 
Market imperfections may  take many  forms:  the  consumption of  some 
goods may impose external benefits or costs that are not reflected in their mar- 
ket prices, informational asymmetries or other factors may lead to the nonex- 
istence of markets for some products, or consumers may not have the informa- 
tion necessary to make appropriate choices. This section considers the sources 
of market imperfections in markets for education and health care. 
10.1.1  Market Imperfections with Respect to Education 
Many of the classical economists broke with their usual laissez-faire view 
of the appropriate role of government when confronted with questions of edu- 
cational policy. In The Wealth of  Nations, Adam Smith argued that “[tlhe state 
derives  no  inconsiderable  advantage from  [the education of  the  common 
people. If instructed  they are] . . . less liable to the delusions of enthusiasm 
and superstition, which among ignorant nations, frequently occasion the most 
dreadful disorders”  (book 5, part 3, article 2).  This reference to societywide 
externalities associated with the education of each individual is only one of the 
potential market imperfections that might warrant government intervention in 
the market for schooling. 
The first, and most commonly alleged, source of a market imperfection with 
respect to education is the presence of externalities from schooling. This argu- 
ment has been made in many ways; Cohn and Geske (1990) provide an over- 
view. Some claim that an educated electorate is vital to a successful democratic 
society, for example, because it permits individuals to keep records,  file tax 
returns, and evaluate campaign material. Others argue that an educated work- 
force is critical for the adoption of  new technologies  and for improving, not 
just an individual’s productivity, but that of  his or her coworkers. Yet a third 
externality argument holds that there is a negative relationship between educa- 280  James M. Poterba 
tion and crime, so that widespread education will reduce crime and the associ- 
ated social disruption. 
A  related  externality  argument, that  applied  with  particular  force to the 
nineteenth-century United States, is that education assists in socializing many 
diverse immigrant groups. This argument is probably specific to public educa- 
tion: providing the same level of education through various parochial schools 
might have a smaller effect on social integration. Widespread public education 
during this period probably helped the “melting pot” to function, and exposed 
groups from different national backgrounds to the civic structure and related 
aspects of the United States. 
Each of these arguments suggests that private spending on education contri- 
butes to a public good. If parents ignore the externalities associated with edu- 
cation in deciding how much to spend on their child’s education, educational 
spending will fall below the socially efficient level. Public policies designed 
to increase educational  attainment  therefore  have some prospect  for raising 
social welfare. 
A second potential rationale for government intervention arises because mi- 
nors, who are the usual recipients of education, are not responsible for deciding 
how much schooling they will obtain. This responsibility falls to their parents, 
who also bear the costs of education.  Since the benefits of  education accrue 
primarily to the children who receive it, the level of spending on education 
depends critically on the degree of parental altruism.  If  parents  place a low 
value on improvements in their children’s future earning potential,  then they 
may underinvest in their children, and government intervention might be justi- 
fied on the ground that it protects children from decisions by their parents.’ 
One difficulty with this argument is that it could be invoked to justify state 
intervention in virtually all aspects of child rearing. Can parents be trusted to 
feed their children properly? To provide the appropriate amount and type of 
playthings  and  other stimuli to early  development? It  is not  clear, as West 
(1970) notes,  that  the risk  of  parental  underprovision  of  education is any 
greater than  the  risk  of  underprovision  of  many  other important  develop- 
mental inputs. 
A third market imperfection that may be relevant for educational decisions 
involves capital market constraints.  If  some households face borrowing con- 
straints that limit their total access to credit or cause them to face borrowing 
rates above the economywide marginal product of capital, then even parents 
whose altruism matched that of the social planner might underinvest  in their 
children. Because loans to obtain education are not backed by tangible collat- 
eral, they are often difficult to obtain in private credit markets. 
1. It  is at least possible that some parents may be more concerned with their children than a 
social planner would be. Parents may also misperceive the value of spending on their children, 
measured in terms of  the corresponding increment to future income or utility, or be concerned 
primarily with the relative status of their children, as discussed in Frank (chap. 6 in this volume). 
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A fourth market imperfection, one that applies most strongly in small com- 
munities with a limited number of children to educate, is the presence of fixed 
costs in educational production. The marginal cost of adding another student 
to a classroom is lower than the average cost of each student’s education. Such 
economy-of-scale arguments, which may also apply to consumption of some 
types of  specialized services in large school districts,  provide an efficiency 
argument for group consumption of educational services. This does not neces- 
sarily imply that the public sector must provide education. 
Although it is relatively easy to construct a list of imperfections in the mar- 
ket for educational services, it is extremely  difficult to panrib  their impor- 
tance. How many parents, for example, would neglect their children’s educa- 
tion? Moreover, while there are undeniably some externalities associated with 
education, primary  and secondary education also yield very high private re- 
turns. The central question is therefore whether there are externalities associ- 
ated with  education above  the level that parents would choose  in a private 
market. Yet virtually none of the empirical evidence on the economic returns to 
education, with the notable exception of Lazear (1983), is directed at this issue. 
Optimal government policy must balance the gains associated with the par- 
tial or complete correction of  market imperfections against the costs of the 
policy  and its associated distortions.  Virtually  any government  intervention, 
whether through price subsidies or through public production of services, dis- 
torts the behavior or private agents. Peltzman (1973) and Sonstelie (1982) are 
among the small group of studies that have explored the inefficiencies created 
by  the current policy of free public provision of education. Peltzman (1973) 
shows that free public school can lead some parents who would otherwise have 
chosen schools better than their local public schools to send their children to 
those schools. This is because lower-quality, but free, public schools may on 
balance  be more attractive to parents  than higher-quality  schools for which 
they must pay tuition. This change in parental behavior can shift the economy 
from one equilibrium level of  educational spending to another equilibrium 
with lower total spending. 
Sonstelie (1982) also concludes that there is a significant efficiency cost to 
free public  schools, but  his argument relies heavily on his  assumption that 
private schools are more efficient providers of educational services than their 
public  school counterparts.’  Neither  of these  studies considers the potential 
costs associated with public rather than private production of educational ser- 
vices. Further work on the private demand for education is important for evalu- 
ating  a number of  current educational reform  proposals,  such as those  for 
2. It is difficult to control for the differences in the attributes of public and private school stu- 
dents in making such efficiency comparisons. Even if private schools appear to be more efficient 
when they are educating only a small and self-selected part of the population, they could be no 
more efficient than  existing public schools  if their student input was the same. Relatively few 
studies have developed convincing empirical strategies for correcting for the endogenous selection 
of students into public and private schools. 282  James M. Poterba 
school vouchers  and other means of introducing  more competition into the 
educational marketplace. 
10.1.2  Market Imperfections with Respect to Health Care 
While potential  market imperfections  with respect to education center on 
externality  issues,  those  with  respect  to health  care focus on  information. 
Arrow’s (1963) seminal analysis emphasizes several potential sources of mar- 
ket imperfection, including asymmetric information between consumers and 
providers of health care services as well as uncertainty about current and future 
needs for medical  services. Uncertainty  leads individuals to demand health 
insurance, and raises the question of whether the insurance market satisfies the 
conditions of perfect  competition. Health care suppliers may also be imper- 
fectly competitive, creating a further potential market imperfection. 
The first potential difficulty with the health care market arises from the lim- 
ited information that patients possess about the benefits associated with various 
medical treatments. The effects of most treatments are random to some degree, 
and patients are not well equipped to evaluate the relevant information on treat- 
ment effects. Individuals rarely confront the same major illness several times, 
so there is little opportunity to acquire information  about the relative perfor- 
mance of different  treatment  regimens.  Moreover, since purchasing  medical 
care typically involves purchasing the services of an expert, quality evaluation 
is critical but very diffi~ult.~  Combining information from many different pa- 
tients is problematic because of potential differences in their presenting condi- 
tions,  so consumers may  have  no objective  measures  of  physician  quality. 
These factors suggest that patients may not make rational choices about which 
health care services to consume. 
The unpredictable  nature of many medical expenses, which leads to a de- 
mand for insurance, gives rise to a separate set of market imperfections. Risk- 
averse individuals can raise their expected utility by purchasing actuarially fair 
medical insurance. But once they have insurance that shares in the cost of their 
medical outlays, their demand for medical care will be distorted because they 
no longer face the full cost of their health care services. The resulting moral 
hazard problem will lead private insurers to offer less than complete insurance 
in the second-best insurance market equilibrium. While moral hazard may lead 
to the absence of complete private insurance markets, it does not necessarily 
provide  a rationale  for government  intervention  in these  markets; the  same 
problems that result from private insurance policies will also arise if the gov- 
ernment provides insurance. 
A related problem with the private medical insurance market turns on ad- 
3. Richard Zeckhauser (1986) also notes that most medical care is a “preclusive good.” Choos- 
ing to have an operation performed by  one physician effectively precludes other physicians from 
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verse  selection  in the purchasing  population.  Rothschild  and Stiglitz ( 1976) 
and Wilson ( 1980)  have shown that when potential insurance buyers are hetero- 
geneous, adverse selection can lead to the disappearance of the markets  for 
some types of insurance, hence to market failure. The government has an im- 
portant advantage relative to private insurers in creating health insurance poli- 
cies: it can compel individuals to participate. Compulsion enables the govern- 
ment to insure everyone at the actuarially fair rate for the entire population. 
There are other potential  imperfections  in the private  health  care market. 
Most medical services are not supplied under perfectly competitive conditions. 
Many hospitals and some specialized physicians may be monopolists in their 
local markets, there may be collusion among the various doctors in an area, 
and there are a range of government subsidies to the production of health care 
professionals that cause deviations from standard efficiency conditions. Exter- 
nalities may also arise in the consumption of medical care. Although small for 
most kinds of health care services, such externalities are present with respect 
to inoculation against infectious diseases and potentially with some other types 
of care as well. 
In the  health  care market,  as with education, it is easier to list potential 
market imperfections than to quantify their substantive importance or to link 
them to potential market interventions. For example, while the 1994  Economic 
Report of  the President cites evidence that a nontrivial fraction of medical pro- 
cedures are not medically necessary, it is not clear that these procedures  are 
the result of informational or other problems. While many analysts agree that 
there are imperfections in the health insurance market, and as Aaron (1994) 
notes, private insurers have evolved a variety  of devices such as experience 
rating, coverage waiting periods,  and exclusions of preexisting conditions to 
address adverse selection problems,  quantitative evidence on the substantive 
consequences of adverse selection remains elusive. 
The vast majority of U.S. citizens currently obtain health insurance in pri- 
vate markets. A significant number of the uninsured have access to insurance, 
but choose not to purchase  Long and Marquis (1992) show that low-wage, 
part-time workers are particularly unlikely to purchase employer-provided in- 
surance. They observe that one reason small firms with substantial numbers of 
such workers do not offer health insurance may be that their workers do not 
demand such coverage. There is virtually no empirical evidence linking vari- 
ous types of market imperfections to the health care utilization decisions of 
households. 
4. Adverse selection may lead insurers to offer some kinds of policies at very high loads relative 
to their actuarial risk. Even if consumers could in principle buy such policies, but do not, there 
may be a case for government intervention to improve the workings of  such markets. Thus the 
availability of an insurance policy per se does not indicate that adverse selection is not a problem. 284  James M. Poterba 
10.2  Redistributive Arguments for Government Provision of  Education 
and Health Care 
While efficiency concerns are one rationale for public policies that intervene 
in the markets for education and health care, they are not the sole or even the 
primary rationale for existing  program^.^ Redistributive concerns also play an 
important role. With respect to both education and health care, many subscribe 
to what Tobin (1970) labeled “specific egalitarianism”: the view that access to 
these services should not be conditioned on income. This section explores the 
redistributive  arguments for  government  intervention  in  these  markets  in 
more detail. 
At the outset, one must ask why redistribution should be linked to particular 
goods, rather than camed out with income transfers. Since the utility gain from 
transferring a given bundle of  goods to a recipient is always less than the recipi- 
ent’s gain from receiving the cash value of these goods, there is a strong a priori 
argument for separating redistribution from the provision of particular goods. 
While this argument applies for each recipient, it may not apply to a transfer 
program as a whole. There are a number of reasons why in-kind programs or 
subsidies to the consumption of particular  goods can be more efficient than 
income redistribution,  even when the consumption of particular  goods does 
not generate externalities. First, in-kind transfers may be better than compara- 
ble cash transfers at channeling resources to a target population. Nichols and 
Zeckhauser (1982) and Besley and Coate (1991) argue that in-kind programs 
may help the government to distinguish  the truly needy from other potential 
program  beneficiaries.  Second, in-kind  programs  may  be attractive policies 
when policy makers seek to impose their preferences on individuals. In educa- 
tion,  for example,  public  policies  specify  the  amount  of  schooling  a child 
must receive. 
A  final explanation  for the use of  in-kind rather  than  cash redistribution 
is political,  rather  than economic. More political  coalitions  support in-kind 
programs than equivalent spending on cash transfers, because in-kind  goods 
and  services are supplied by  identifiable industries.  Thus, there are interest 
groups that benefit from in-kind redistribution. Teachers and health care pro- 
fessionals may support expanded government transfers in their respective mar- 
kets, even if they do not support expanded income redistribution  in generaL6 
West  (1967,  1970) argues that,  even  if  public  provision  of  education  was 
needed in the United States in the mid-nineteenth  century to overcome a lack 
of infrastructure for delivering educational services, it was not needed for long. 
5. Zeckhauser (1986). in an essay that explores issues similar to those raised here, concludes 
that “only a small portion of [the vast subsidies and direct payments for health care and education] 
can be justified primarily on the basis that they provide public goods or remedy market failures” 
(47). 
6. Doctors, however, opposed the passage of Medicare and Medicaid in  1965, on the grounds 
that these programs were the first steps to socialized medicine. 285  Government Intervention in Markets for Education and Health Care 
West (1967) identifies support from several organized interest groups, includ- 
ing teachers, as essential to the continued growth of public schools. 
10.2.1  Redistributive Concerns and Education 
Providing “equal opportunity” is one of  the objectives of  current policies 
with respect to education. Since parental resources are unequal, even if parents 
value their children’s lifetime utility in the same way as the social planner and 
face well-functioning capital markets, there will be differences in the level of 
education that children receive in a private market for education. Such differ- 
ences may translate into differences in lifetime earning opportunities, which 
some argue against as unfair because they are beyond the children’s control. 
The public sector must therefore ensure access to adequate education for all, 
either by supplying a basic educational services package, or through a system 
of income-linked subsidies of the price of education. Zeckhauser (1986) notes 
that equality can be defined in many, sometimes inconsistent, ways: equality 
of the price at which different households can purchase a given service, equal- 
ity of the quantity of service consumed by different households, and equality 
of the outcome of service consumption are three examples. 
In the United States, public education has historically been a responsibility 
of  local government, although there has been a trend in the last half century 
toward greater centralization of finance at the state rather than the local level. 
For the  1990-91  school year, local revenue sources accounted for 46.5% of 
public spending on primary and secondary education, compared with 47.3% 
from state governments and 6.2% from the federal government (U.S. Depart- 
ment of Education  1993, table 156). In 1947-48,  local governments provided 
57.9% of the money, while two decades earlier, in  1929-30,  the local share 
was 82.7%. 
Local financing raises important qualifications to the redistributive power of 
public spending on education. Because communities differ in their tax bases 
and  their  willingness  to  impose  taxes,  there  is  substantial  variation  across 
places in spending levels. Although a number of court decisions during the 
last three decades have weakened the link between educational spending and 
property  taxes on the grounds that the property  tax base is highly unequal 
across communities, disparities across jurisdictions remain. Wealthy commu- 
nities spend more on schools than poor communities, so the existing system of 
locally provided education is not as redistributive as it would be if  a higher 
level of government were the primary service provider. 
Since the incidence of local taxes is primarily on the residents of local juris- 
dictions, at least when individuals are free to move, local public provision of 
education is tantamount to taxing all residents of a jurisdiction to pay for the 
average level of educational consumption in the community. This policy can 
redistribute resources within a community, but it is a weak device for redistrib- 
uting  resources between  those  in  different communities. Milton  Friedman 
(1962) argues that the present combination of local government provision of 286  James M. Poterba 
education and reliance on local property tax finance makes it more difficult 
for low-income families to purchase high-quality education. This is because 
consuming high-quality public  education usually  requires purchasing an ex- 
pensive house in a school district with high-quality schools. This can require 
a much greater outlay of resources than simply purchasing higher-quality edu- 
cation. 
10.2.2  Redistribution and the Government’s Role in Health Care 
“Specific egalitarianism” also applies to universal access to health care. The 
recent health care debate provides many examples of policy makers and politi- 
cal leaders who believe that access to adequate health care should not be condi- 
tioned on ability to pay, and there seems to be substantial popular support for 
this view. Whether the stronger claim, that those with higher incomes should 
not have access to better care than those with low incomes, commands support 
is less clear. In any event, redistributive objectives play a central part in the 
design of government health care policy. Gornick et al. (1985) report that in 
1963, on the eve of Medicare’s passage, only 56% of those over sixty-five years 
old had health insurance. The insurance rate for younger age groups was sub- 
stantially greater, even though the need for medical care was greater among 
the elderly population, and this was one of the factors contributing to support 
for Medicare. 
Government policies to subsidize health insurance and health care redistrib- 
ute along at least two dimensions. First, as with most redistributive programs, 
such subsidies transfer resources to those with relatively  low incomes. With 
respect to medical care, however, one must also distinguish between  the ex 
ante value of government insurance, before learning about a household’s medi- 
cal needs, and the ex post value of the insurance, after such needs are observed. 
The second aspect of  redistribution within  government health programs is a 
transfer from those who do not require much medical assistance to those who 
do. Because health outlays are highly  concentrated, with estimates for 1994 
suggesting that 20.3% of all health spending will be accounted for by the 1.6% 
of the population with more than $30,000 in spending, and 5  1.3% of spending 
will be done by the 8.1% of the population with more than $10,000 in health 
care outlays, the second form of redistribution can be quite important.’ 
Even if government subsidies to health insurance were not age-related, the 
age-specific pattern of medical care demand would lead such subsidies to re- 
distribute to the elderly. The current structure of health care programs in the 
United States, with eligibility for Medicare conditioned on reaching age sixty- 
five, accentuates this redistribution. Such policies raise the standard of living 
of elderly households, and they also may reduce the financial and other burdens 
7.  Economic Report of the President 1995, 143. These statistics include all medical care spend- 
ing, including preventative, routine, and acute care. Spending on acute care is even more concen- 
trated, with Aaron (chap. 4 in this volume) reporting that 5% of the population account for more 
than half of the outlays in a given year. 287  Government Intervention in Markets for Education and Health Care 
on the children of the elderly, who would otherwise need to devote attention 
and resources to their care.x 
The intergenerational  pattern  of benefits associated  with medical care for 
the elderly is an important but relatively unexplored  issue, and one that may 
be critical to explaining the political support for these  program^.^ Most individ- 
uals in middle age have surviving parents. For example, Himes (1994) shows 
that  in  1987, the  probability  that  a  thirty-five-year-old  white  woman  had 
two living parents was approximately .60. The probability that she had at least 
one living parent was greater than .90, substantially higher than the probabil- 
ity that she had at least one child (.81). The probability that a white woman 
has at least one living parent does not fall below one-half until she reaches her 
early fifties. Thus altruism from children to parents can explain political sup- 
port among middle-aged individuals with respect to health care policy for the 
elderly. It is also possible that part of the increased taxes required to finance 
such  benefits will  be offset by  higher  bequests from parents  who  received 
transfers  and therefore  did not have to spend down their  wealth  during  re- 
tirement. 
10.3  The Choice of Instruments: Subsidies, Mandates, and 
Government Provision 
Why is the nature of government involvement in education and health care 
so different? In the health care market, the government plays a largely financial 
role, purchasing health care services provided by the private market, while in 
the market for educational services, it is the single largest supplier of the ser- 
vice in question. This section considers the structure of public-sector interven- 
tions in private markets, given that there is a market imperfection or redistribu- 
tive justification for some market intervention. 
The basic  criterion that a social planner  would use to choose a means of 
market intervention is clear: select the policy that provides the highest level of 
social welfare. In practice, policy choices involve important political aspects 
that may dwarf direct social welfare concerns. Suppressing political considera- 
tions for the moment, this section considers the factors that determine the rela- 
tive merits of different policy instruments. 
The choice among various alternatives depends not only on the market im- 
perfection that motivates government intervention in private markets, but also 
on the costs of  different methods of intervention and the capacity of govern- 
ment  officials to  obtain  the  information  needed for successful  intervention. 
8. Davis and Schoen (1978) explicitly mention reduced burdens on middle-aged  children of 
elderly households as one of the benefits of Medicare. Cutler and Sheiner (1994)  show that govem- 
ment provision of nursing home care displaces a substantial amount of  care that would otherwise 
have been provided by children. 
9.  This question may be even more central to analyzing public support for provision of  nursing 
home care rather than medical care. 288  James M. Poterba 
These latter concerns suggest that even if there is a market imperfection, it 
may be optimal for the government not to intervene because the cost of govern- 
ment action  would exceed the gains from remedying market imperfections. 
This possibility,  “government  failure,”  has been  discussed for example by 
McKean and Minasian (1966) and Wolf (1993). 
This section  compares price  subsidies,  government  mandates, and direct 
government service provision. It discusses the advantages and disadvantages 
of each. The next section describes actual polices toward education and health 
care in  the United  States, and  asks whether  the various  considerations de- 
scribed below can explain the structure of current policies. 
10.3.1  Price Subsidies 
The textbook  remedy  for  externalities  that  are  not  reflected  in  private 
choices is a “Pigouvian tax” that alters the price individuals face, so that their 
private choices will yield the socially efficient level of consumption. In prac- 
tice, a range of public policies are available to alter the private cost of purchas- 
ing services such as education and medical care. These include tax subsidies, 
direct subsidies such as Medicare that involve government financing of most 
or all service consumption, and incentives to the production of services, such 
as grants to medical schools or interest-free loans for medical students. 
The efficacy of price subsidies depends critically on the price elasticity of 
demand for the subsidized service. When this elasticity is low, when there is 
uncertainty  about this elasticity, or when  there  is a wide divergence  across 
households in this elasticity, then price subsidies may be an unattractive form 
of market intervention. Weitzman (1974) develops an argument of this form in 
his comparison of “prices vs. quantities” as alternative means of regulation. 
There is no consensus on the empirical magnitude of the price elasticities of 
demand for education and medical care. Studies of the demand for education 
typically compare local public spending in different towns, and invoke the me- 
dian voter model to argue that each town’s spending is the level demanded by 
the town’s  median voter. There are many  potential  difficulties  with  this ap- 
proach, including the potential influence of political institutions such as Pro- 
position  13 on  local  spending, and the problem of  modeling the choice of 
local  spending  when  jurisdictions  are  imperfectly  competitive.  Studies 
of this type usually yield relatively small estimates of the price elasticity of 
demand; Sonstelie’s (1982) study of California, for example, suggests a value 
In the medical care market, the central problem is the potential endogeneity 
of health insurance, which has an important effect on the net price of  medical 
care services. Some of the most convincing empirical evidence to date on the 
price elasticity of demand for medical care is based on the RAND Health In- 
surance Experiment, a systematic social experiment that was conducted in four 
cities during the  mid-1970s.  In  analyzing  the  resulting  data, Keeler  et al. 
(1988) report an elasticity of demand for total medical care of -.22  for house- 
holds facing copayment rates of greater than 25%. The estimated demand elas- 
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ticity for well-patient care is greater, -  .43, while the elasticity for hospital care 
is -. 14. 
Specific egalitarianism  with respect to health care does not imply that all 
individuals  should consume the same amount of medical care; some people 
need very little care in a given year. Rather, it implies equality of access, so 
that, conditional  on need, individuals  have the  same opportunity  to receive 
care. This suggests that, from the standpoint of public policy, a key parameter 
is the price elasticity of insurance demand rather than medical care demand. 
The demand for insurance is substantially more price sensitive than the de- 
mand for health care. Gruber and Poterba (1994) present evidence, based on 
changes in tax incentives for insurance purchase in the 1980s, suggesting that 
the price elasticity of insurance demand is between  -1 and  -2. These esti- 
mates, which are based on the effects within several years around a tax reform 
that reduced the after-tax cost of insurance for the self-employed, may some- 
what overstate the long-run elasticity of demand for insurance. They are never- 
theless  consistent  with  earlier studies  using different  methodologies,  which 
also suggest large price effects on insurance demand. 
These elasticity estimates suggest that, while price subsidies may have sub- 
stantial effects on the demand for health insurance, they are not likely to have 
large effects on the demand for education. This has direct implications for 
the choice of policy instrument: price subsidies to education may not be very 
successful in altering the quantity of services in the private market. 
The principal advantage of price subsidies is that they preserve individual 
choice in selecting service providers and the level of services to be consumed. 
Such choice permits individuals to search for goods and services with qualities 
or other attributes  that are well  suited to their  needs. If  there is substantial 
heterogeneity in household tastes, than allowing individual choice can have a 
substantial  positive  effect on consumer welfare.I0 The difficult  case arises 
when recognizing this heterogeneity may exacerbate the market imperfections 
or inequality that public policy is designed to address. 
One drawback with price subsidies is that they create incentives for house- 
holds to recategorize nonsubsidized expenditures in an attempt to qualify them 
for the subsidy. This problem, the dual of the tax-collection problem in which 
taxpayers  redefine  taxable  income into  nontaxable  forms, has  two  conse- 
quences. First, it means that the revenue cost of a price subsidy may be greater 
than the subsidy rate times the actual amount of  the subsidized activity. Sec- 
ond, and significantly if the government’s objective is to ensure that everyone 
consumes a minimal service level, the private market may create “sham trans- 
actions”  that  qualify  for the  price  subsidy  but  do not  achieve  the  govern- 
ment’s goals. 
Education illustrates the potential problem  with sham transactions.  If par- 
ents received subsidies for school spending, but “schools” were not well de- 
10. This argument presumes that consumers are capable of  making rational demand decisions, 
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fined for this purpose,  one could imagine a range of  service providers who 
would  commingle services  for parents  with  educational services.  Schools 
might, for example, organize family field trips that were of value to parents as 
well as children, and include the cost of these trips in tuition charges. The ease 
or difficulty of monitoring  such sham transactions  affects the desirability of 
using price subsidies to encourage service consumption. 
Two additional problems  deserve  mention  when  subsidies are enacted as 
part  of the tax system, as they  are with  some aspects of health  care. First, 
because marginal tax rates are progressive, a subsidy that operates by allowing 
individuals  to deduct certain  expenditures  from taxable  income will have a 
larger marginal effect on the price paid by high-income  households than on 
that paid by low-income households. Second, the effective subsidy rate in this 
case is affected by changes in the income tax system, changes that may bear 
no relation to changes in the rate of subsidy that is suggested by the underlying 
market imperfections. 
10.3.2  Government Mandates 
One alternative to price subsidies is a government mandate that all house- 
holds purchase a particular good or service. The discussion of “individual man- 
dates” in the recent health insurance reform debate provides an example: indi- 
viduals  would  be  required  to  purchase  health  insurance  satisfying  some 
criteria, but these policies could be purchased in the private market. Current 
requirements that employers purchase  workers compensation  insurance,  and 
that children receive certain vaccinations before beginning elementary school, 
are examples of government mandates. 
The primary advantage of mandates is that they ensure universal consump- 
tion, and they can be tailored  to directly  control levels of consumption. By 
mandating that all children in certain age groups attend an accredited elemen- 
tary or secondary school, current legislation achieves at least one measure of 
equality in educational consumption. When concerns about equity in outcomes 
rather than opportunity  motivate policies, mandates may be attractive policy 
instruments.  Mandates can be open-ended, requiring  all individuals  to con- 
sume at least a certain amount of a service, or they may be close-ended, speci- 
fying precisely the good or service that is to be consumed. The latter achieves 
a greater degree of equality across individuals, at the welfare cost of denying 
individual choice. 
It is important to contrast the effects of price subsidies with the effect of 
government mandates in the framework suggested by Weitzman (1974). With 
price-based  instruments, at least ex ante, it is difficult to assess the quantity 
response to a policy. This makes such instruments  unattractive in situations 
where there are substantial benefits to particular levels of service consumption, 
as might be the case with some levels of  education or some types of inocula- 
tions. Mandates, with or without public service provision, solve this problem 
because they specify the level of service consumption, but they impose ex ante 
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A secondary  advantage  of mandates,  which  can be very important  in the 
political  economy of policy  design, is that they  can be designed  to impose 
costs on individuals or firms without affecting government budgets. In times 
of fiscal stringency, such as the present, mandates may be particularly attractive 
to policy makers because they provide a mechanism for affecting real activity 
without spending money. Some popular discussions of public policy appear to 
exhibit confusion about the relationship between taxes and mandates, and there 
appears to be more political opposition  to new taxes  than to new mandates 
with economically equivalent effects. This is one of the reasons that mandates 
played a central role in the recent discussion of health care reform. 
Mandates require a well-functioning private market for the mandated good 
or service if they are to succeed. Mandating that consumers purchase a service 
that is supplied under conditions of imperfect competition, for example, may 
have less favorable effects on social welfare than mandating purchase of a ser- 
vice  that is competitively  supplied.  This issue  arises with respect to health 
insurance mandates: if one of the market imperfections in health insurance is 
that adverse selection leads to missing insurance markets, a mandate without 
government insurance provision may be ineffective. 
The economic analysis of government mandates is not as well developed as 
the analysis of taxes and price subsidies, but several points about the efficiency 
consequences of mandates nevertheless deserve mention. First, by mandating 
minimum levels of consumption but not altering the price of services for those 
who want  to consume more  than the mandate level,  open-ended mandates 
avoid  distorting  the  behavior  of  higher-consumption  households. Summers 
(1989) emphasizes this point in his discussion of employer mandates. Second, 
assuming that individuals must pay to satisfy the mandate either by purchasing 
the mandated good or service, or through reduced wages if the mandate affects 
employers,”  then a mandate is a form of “benefit  tax.” Leaving aside issues 
of efficiency in production,  a mandate for individual consumption of a given 
commodity bundle  is equivalent to government  provision of this bundle,  fi- 
nanced by a lump-sum tax. 
The welfare  cost of  a  mandate  depends on the  difference  between  the 
amount the individual values the mandated  good and the cost of purchasing 
this good. At least in some cases, the efficiency cost of a mandate can be sub- 
stantially smaller than the efficiency cost of tax-financed government provision 
of the service.’* Mandates may therefore be attractive in situations where total 
private spending on a good is large, but the government wants to increase this 
I I.  Gruber (1994) summarizes previous work, and presents new evidence, on how wages adjust 
to government mandates that firms provide certain benefits to their workers. When mandates apply 
only to a subgroup of employees, wages may decline for some workers who do not benefit from 
the mandate, and they may not decline by the full amount of  the mandate’s cost for some workers 
who do benefit. 
12. Mandates can avoid the distortions associated with providing  a given level of  a good or 
service to all individuals, but they cannot avoid the distortions that follow from attempts to redis- 
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spending without  transferring  all  of  the  initial  outlays  into the  government 
sector. 
10.3.3  Public Provision 
A third means of encouraging consumption of particular services involves 
direct public production. This could be combined either with a regime in which 
service recipients do not pay, and costs of production are covered through tax 
revenues, as with education, or with a regime in which consumers are charged 
when they purchase  government-produced goods and  services. The Govern- 
ment Printing Office and state universities are examples of the latter system. 
Government production can be, but need not be, coupled with a mandate for 
consumption. 
Public provision  differs from price subsidies and mandates in that it gives 
government  greater control  over the nature  of the services individuals  con- 
sume. This can also be achieved in the other cases by  regulating the product 
that is subsidized or mandated, but in some cases the costs of regulation may 
make this an unacceptable strategy. In the case of education, for example, one 
reason for substantial government production may be the difficulty  of  speci- 
fying a required school curriculum for nongovernment providers, although the 
existence of accredited private schools raises some question about this expla- 
nation. Public provision can also be a device for restricting potentially wasteful 
private competition among consumers, which Frank (chap. 6 in this volume) 
suggests may apply to some extent with respect to educational and other ser- 
vices consumed by middle- and upper-income households. 
Government control may also be important when distributional  issues that 
might be difficult to resolve in the private sector arise in the allocation of ser- 
vices. In education, for example, there may be important externalities across 
children within a classroom or school.13  How would the private market handle 
the disruptive child who imposes negative externalities on other children? Pos- 
sibly by excluding  him from the  school, or by  charging him a premium  to 
attend  school. If  these responses seem unacceptable  to notions of justice or 
equal opportunity, it may be necessary for the government to control the pro- 
duction process. 
A distinct reason for government provision of some services is that profit- 
making enterprises may place their bottom lines ahead of concerns about qual- 
ity or appropriateness  of service, undermining public confidence in their ser- 
vices. In such situations, nonprofit providers may emerge, or the public sector 
may assume responsibility for service delivery.14  At a time when public confi- 
13. The extent of peer-group effects and within-classroom externalities in the educational pro- 
cess is controversial. For example, Henderson, Mieskowski, and Sauvageau (1978) find positive 
externalities from being exposed to high-achievement students; other studies find weaker results. 
14. Nonprofit providers avoid the charge of profit-maximization  service delivery, but they may 
also be subject to some of the production inefficiencies that may characterize public production. 
Hansmann (chap. 9 in this volume) discusses the role of  nonprofits  in health and education and 
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dence in government seems very low, however, it is difficult to know whether 
consumers would prefer a for-profit hospital, which may deliver services that 
they don’t need but that generate profits, or a public hospital, which may deliver 
low-quality versions of services they do need. 
There are several arguments against public service provision. One is that the 
government is characterized by “production inefficiency” as a service provider. 
There have been numerous studies of the relative efficiency of public and pri- 
vate provision, surveyed for example by Vining and Boardman (1992). These 
studies, while not conclusive or uniform, suggest that government production 
is less efficient than private production, although the comparison between gov- 
ernment production and nonprofit production, common in education and health 
care, is less clear. Bureaucrats who do not face the discipline of a competitive 
market may  make inefficient choices with respect  to factor inputs and their 
choice of output. 
A brief summary of the state of research comparing efficiency at public and 
private health care facilities illustrates the lack of consensus. Lindsay (1976) 
compares various measures related to productivity at VA  and private hospitals. 
The findings are mixed: lengths of stay for given procedures are longer at VA 
hospitals, but the staff-to-patient ratios are also significantly lower, in contrast 
to the inefficient input hypothesis. Becker and Sloan (1985) analyze data from 
the American  Hospital Association’s  1979 Survey of  Hospitals  on for-profit, 
nonprofit, and government hospitals. They do not find any pronounced differ- 
ences in hospital costs across forms of ownership. Schulz, Greenley, and Pe- 
terson (1984) compare the costs of public and private mental health services, 
and contrary to the earlier hospital studies, they find substantially lower costs 
for private-sector providers. The existing literature on hospital costs is not con- 
clusive, but  it  is far richer  than the  literature  on the costs of public  versus 
private education. Further work on the relative efficiency of different forms of 
ownership in both health and education therefore is needed to judge the cost 
of public production of services. 
A second disadvantage to public provision is the absence of any objective 
standard for which services should be provided. For a profit-maximizing firm, 
services that generate profits will be provided. But for a tax-supported public 
institution, there are no such guidelines, and there is a resulting risk of over- 
provision of services, or of providing the wrong services. 
A third disadvantage,  which  applies when  publicly  provided  services are 
tax-financed, involves the efficiency cost of raising revenue.  If  total govern- 
ment spending to provide a given set services is C, but this amount is raised 
through taxes, then the cost imposed on the private sector is (1 + A)C, where 
A is the marginal deadweight loss of raising tax revenue. For the current U.S. 
tax system as a whole, estimates suggest a value of A near .30. Ballard, Shoven, 
and Whalley (1985) provide support for this estimate. This efficiency cost of 
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10.4  Mixing and Matching Instruments: Current Policy toward 
Education and Health Care 
Actual government intervention in the markets for education and health care 
involves each of the three policy  instruments  described  above. This section 
describes  the  nature  and evolution  of government  policies  in both  of  these 
areas, and then tries to evaluate whether efficiency considerations, redistribu- 
tive objectives, or other factors explain the nature of observed policies. 
10.4.1 
Public provision as well as mandates and price subsidies are evident in the 
market for education. Local governments are direct suppliers of most primary 
and secondary educational services. Yet with respect to preelementary educa- 
tion (child care), the government’s role as a provider is limited. There are some 
price subsidies to consumers, and some regulations on private market provid- 
ers. In higher education, there are price subsidies through a variety of student 
loan programs, which also alleviate capital market constraints, but state gov- 
ernments are also direct producers of higher educational services. 
Before describing  policies  toward  primary  and secondary education, it is 
important to note that it is difficult to separate child care and education on any 
a priori basis. There is evidence that much of a child’s performance in school 
is predictable from his or her preparation for elementary school, that is, from 
what would traditionally be labeled “child care.” This subsection therefore de- 
scribes government policies toward child care as well as primary, secondary, 
and higher education. 
The vast majority of care for children under the age of five is provided in 
the home and/or by  relatives. In  1991, 30.3% of children were cared for at 
home by a relative, 5.7% at home by a nonrelative, 13.1% in another home by 
a relative, 17.9% in another home by a nonrelative, and 23% in an organized 
child care facility.” The majority (62%) of the 2.9 million children enrolled in 
nursery  school  programs  were  in  private-sector  programs.  Thus the over- 
whelming majority of care for children who are not yet old enough to attend 
elementary school was provided either by the private market or through non- 
market transactions within families or other social groups. This is paradoxical, 
since many of the arguments that might be advanced to justify public interven- 
tion in the market for education plausibly apply with even greater force to child 
care than to elementary education. 
Child care for children in families where both  parents  work, or where a 
single parent works, is partly subsidized by the federal income tax code. The 
child care credit provides a credit of 30% of child care costs for families with 
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15. The remaining children were cared for in a variety of  other arrangements. Data are based 
on the Survey of Income and Program Participation, as reported in the U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
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adjusted gross incomes  (AGIs) of less than $10,000, and phases down to a 
credit rate of 20% for those with AGIs of more than $28,000. The maximum 
amount of expenditures to which the credit can be applied is limited to $2,400 
for families with one child, and $4,800 for families with two or more children. 
There is also a federal tax provision  that allows employees to pay for some 
child care expenses using dependent care accounts, which are offered by some 
employers as part of cafeteria-plan benefits. These accounts are more valuable 
than  the child care credit for high-income  households, but the total federal 
revenue loss associated with these accounts is small. 
There is a sharp contrast between government involvement in the markets 
for child care and education. Most primary and secondary educational services 
in the United States are publicly provided. Primary and secondary education is 
both mandatory and free. In 1991,90.7% of elementary and secondary school 
students were enrolled in public schools, and per-student expenditure averaged 
$4,622. At the college level, the public-sector role is weaker but still strong: 
78.7% of college students are enrolled in public colleges (see the Statistical 
Abstract of  the United States: 1994, Table 228). Real public spending has in- 
creased during the last three decades, due both to the rising real costs of educa- 
tional inputs and to increased inputs per student. Hanushek and Rivkin (1994) 
report that the pupil-teacher ratio in U.S. schools, for example, has declined 
from 26.3 in 1950 to 20.5 in 1970 to 15.4 in 1990. 
Table 10.1 presents data on the estimated cost of various government pro- 
grams that affect children, as compiled by the House Committee on Ways and 
Means, augmented with information on state and local educational spending. 
The table includes information on outlays for programs that are targeted only 
to preschoolers,  such as Head Start and other compensatory  education  pro- 
grams, as well  as the share of broader programs,  such as food  stamps and 
Medicaid, that is received by children. The table shows that, with the exception 
of spending on primary and secondary education, most of the programs tar- 
geted at children are relatively  small. Moreover, most of these programs are 
targeted at children in poverty. The child care tax credit and the dependent care 
allowance are two of the few that are available to children in families above 
the poverty line.16 
In light of the substantial flow of tax revenue to primary and secondary edu- 
cation in the United States, it is natural to ask whether concerns about market 
imperfections, a desire for redistribution, or  other factors stimulated govern- 
ment support for education. The start of public education in the United States 
can be traced to a  1647 law of the Massachusetts Bay Colony directing any 
town with at least fifty families to hire a teacher, and any town with at least 
one hundred families to support a grammar school that could prepare young 
16. This situation contrasts sharply with that in some European countries, where governments 
provide child care to a substantial fraction of households. Ohlsson and Rosen (1994) report that, 
in Sweden, 57% of preschool children were in public day care in  1992, while a very high fraction 
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Table 10.1  Government Spending Programs Directed toward Children, 1990 
Program Description  Spending (billion $) 
Cash transfers 
Social Security 
Supplemental Security Income 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
Veterans Compensation 







Low Income Energy Assistance 
Federal educational programs 
Compensatory education 
Impact Aid 
Education for the handicapped 
Other educational programs 
Child support programs 
Human development (Head Start and other) 
Foster care/adoption assistance 
Maternal and child health and immunization 
Summer youth employment 
Other 
Revenue loss from tax credits 
Earned Income Tax Credit 
Dependent care credit 
Exclusion of employer-provided dependent care 
Exclusion of  benefits provided through cafeteria plans 
Other federal programs 



























Sources; US.  Congress 1993, 1566-67; author’s tabulations. 
men to attend a university. The introduction of this law, reproduced in Johnson 
et al. (1982), does not  suggest concern with either market imperfections or 
redistribution: “It being one chiefe project of y ould deluder, Satan, to keeepe 
men from the knowledge of y Scriptures, . . .  evy towneship in this jurisdiction 
. . . shall appoint one within  their towne to  teach all such children as shall 
resort to him to write and read” (252).  While legislative language is not always 
a reliable guide to the factors that led to passage of a law, it may nevertheless 
be informative. This passage suggests a paternalistic desire to educate children. 
This was complemented by a concern that, without schools, the Massachusetts 
Bay Colony would not be able to ensure a future supply of ministers. 
The Massachusetts law was a model for public  school legislation in other 
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the nineteenth century. In the South, for example, with large plantations and 
few towns with critical population mass, schooling for the children of wealthy 
planters was usually provided by private tutors. In the middle Atlantic states, 
the school environment in the years following settlement involved a collection 
of private schools, many with religious affiliations. These states received many 
immigrants in the nineteenth century, and the growth of public schools in these 
states was justified in large part on the argument that such schools would facili- 
tate assimilation of recent immigrants. Redistributive concerns did not appear 
to play an important role. The current concern about equality of access arose 
ufrer public schools were well established in the United States.” 
The evolution of public high schools in the United States also suggests that 
redistributive  concerns were not central. When public  high schools first  be- 
came popular in the late 18OOs, their incidence was regressive. Only the chil- 
dren of middle- and upper-income  families could afford to remain in school 
beyond the elementary  level, so they were the primary beneficiaries of these 
schools. Over time, the extent of participation in these schools grew, but simi- 
lar arguments about regressive benefits have been applied to publicly financed 
colleges and universities in the period since World War II.ls 
The heavy reliance on local government provision of education in the United 
States, which contrasts with the situation in many Western European democra- 
cies, also undermines the importance of redistribution  as an explanation  for 
public provision of education.Iy  Because local governments depended heavily 
on the local property tax base for their revenue stream, different towns even 
within small metropolitan areas have historically devoted very different levels 
of resources to their public schools. 
10.4.2 
Government involvement in the market for medical care is even more diverse 
than that with respect to child care and education. The federal government’s 
Medicare and Medicaid programs involve substantial government financing for 
private purchases of health care, while the VA  and many state and local govern- 
ments operate a network of hospitals. Unlike teachers, however, most health 
care professionals  work  for private firms or nonprofit institutions,  although 
they are often subject to substantial government regulation. 
Direct government  spending on health  services and supplies totaled $368 
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17. West (1967, 1970) describes the expansion of publicly provided education in the United 
States, emphasizing the role of a growing education bureaucracy in expanding the public sector’s 
role. 
18. Hansen and Weisbrod (1969) present evidence suggesting that the net benefits of the Univer- 
sity of California system are greater for high- than for low-income households. 
19. The apparently limited explanatory power of market imperfections and redistributive con- 
cerns to explain government provision of primary and secondary education suggests the need for 
alternative explanations. Lott (1987) considers a number of possibilities and discusses in particular 
the potential for “indoctrination” of particular  values. This hypothesis is  developed  further in 
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billion in 1992, 45.5% of total health care outlays (Congressional Budget Of- 
fice 1992). The government’s spending share was substantially greater for hos- 
pital care and nursing home services. Government funds also represented more 
than 60% of the costs of medical research and medical facilities construction. 
The government’s share of the aggregate health care budget has grown sub- 
stantially in the last three decades. In  1965, government spending accounted 
for 24.7% of health care outlays in the United States, with state and local gov- 
ernments accounting for more than half of this total (13.2%). Since the enact- 
ment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, however, the federal government’s 
role has increased. Federal spending accounted for 31.3% of  all health care 
outlays in 1992, compared with 28% a decade earlier. Projections suggest even 
more rapid growth in the government’s role in the future, as a consequence of 
both demographic change and continued growth in the relative cost of health 
care services. 
Table  10.2 reports direct government spending on health care, as well as 
forgone revenue associated with several tax expenditures, for 1992. The single 
largest program supporting health care services is Medicare, which accounted 
for more than  $130 billion and is projected  to increase to more than $250 
billion by the end of this decade. There are also substantial foregone revenues 
associated with the tax expenditures for health insurance ($45 billion), as well 
as substantial tax expenditures from the federal income tax deduction for med- 
ical expenditures in excess of 7.5% of adjusted gross income, and deductions 
for charitable contributions  to  health  care  institutions.  Direct  government 
spending on health care is substantially less important than federal payments 
for health care from others. Federal outlays on the VA  health system, for ex- 
ample, were $14 billion in  1992, or 6.3% of total federal spending on health 
care. 
The Medicare program has two parts. The first, Medicare Part A, provides 
hospital insurance for the elderly. This component of Medicare is funded with 
the revenues from a payroll tax on most employed workers, so it involves ex- 
plicit  intergenerational  redistribution. Medicare  Part  B,  or Supplementary 
Medical Insurance (SMI), provides insurance for outpatient services at hospi- 
tals and the costs of physician visits. SMI is an optional insurance program, 
although the vast majority of eligible households purchase it. Elderly individu- 
als who choose to participate pay premiums that represent roughly one-quarter 
of the cost of this insurance. The balance of the cost is financed from general 
revenues. Since all elderly individuals are eligible for the same benefits under 
Medicare, this aspect of the program redistributes from high- to low-income 
elderly households. On a lifetime basis, this redistribution  is partly undone, 
although probably not reversed, by the use of a regressive flat-rate payroll tax 
to finance Medicare benefits. 
Tax subsidies for the purchase of health insurance and health care are the 
government provisions that affect the largest number of health care consumers. 
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Table 10.2  Government Spending on Medical Care, 1992 (billion $) 
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Total  428 
Source; Author's tabulations based on information in Congressional Budget Office 1992, tables  I1 
and B-2. 
rules allowing households to deduct medical expenses in excess of 7.5% of 
AGI when computing taxable income, reduce the price of health care for most 
taxpayers. The reduction  in the after-tax price of insurance raises  insurance 
coverage among employed households. While the decision not to tax the value 
of employer-provided health insurance was taken with the recognition that this 
would spur private insurance coverage, some of  the most rapid growth in em- 
ployer provision of such insurance took place during World War 11,  when wage 
controls made it difficult for employers to raise compensation in other ways. 
Tax  subsidies  may encourage private  spending, but they  are weak instru- 
ments for redistribution  across households. Since marginal tax rates increase 
with household income, high-income  households receive the largest percent- 
age subsidy to their purchases of both health insurance and medical care. 
Medicaid, the other major government direct outlay program, pays for health 
insurance for poor households. The program is administered by the states sub- 
ject to federal guidelines. Federal Medicaid spending is the most rapidly grow- 
ing government health care outlay, exhibiting  an annual growth rate of  15% 
between  1987 and  1990, and  28% between  1990 and  1992, although  these 
growth rates are not expected to persist. A substantial part of the rapid growth 
in the early 1990s was due to state gaming of federal reimbursement rules to 
maximize federal contribution to the state programs. 
The history of government intervention in the medical marketplace suggests 
that redistributive  concerns were the primary  motivation for passage  of the 
Social Security Amendments of  1965, which created Medicare and Medicaid. 
There is a long political history to the debate on public health insurance in the 
United States; see for example Starr (1982). A number of European countries, 300  James M. Poterba 
notably Germany and England, adopted universal health insurance laws in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. There was active discussion of 
such proposals just before World War I in the United States, as part of a battery 
of policies supported by the Progressives. Their motivation appeared to be spe- 
cific egalitarianism, the provision of health insurance as a basic human right. 
The outbreak of World War I derailed legislative interest in these proposals, 
however, and, facing some opposition from doctors who did not want govern- 
ment to infringe their professional sovereignty, these proposals did not attract 
much attention in the fifteen years after World War I. 
The next wave of interest in national health insurance occurred during the 
New Deal, when President Roosevelt considered but rejected the idea of in- 
cluding health insurance in the legislation that became the Social Security Act 
of  1935. Once  again, opposition  from doctors  was an  important  stumbling 
block. Although FDR never embraced national  health insurance as a critical 
policy goal, President Truman did, and in 1948 he launched a major campaign 
to secure passage of a national health bill. The American Medical Association 
(AMA), by then a well-organized lobbying group, undertook an all-out cam- 
paign to block passage of this legislation. The debate took place during a pe- 
riod of great concern about Communist influence in the United States, and the 
AMAs labeling of the Truman proposals as “socialized medicine” and linking 
these proposals to Leninism proved successful in defeating them. The Social 
Security Amendments  of  1950 did, however, stipulate that federal matching 
funds would  be provided  for medical payments to health care providers  for 
medical care to those on public assistance. This was a first step toward federal 
provision of medical care for the needy, and it was expanded ten years later in 
the Kerr-Mills Act (1960). 
The debate that led to passage of Medicare and Medicaid was joined in the 
mid- 1960s, as part of the Great Society program. By this time, concern about 
access to health care for low-income and elderly households had become acute, 
in part because rising health care costs made it more difficult for these groups 
to obtain care. Only 56% of the elderly had health insurance prior to the pas- 
sage of Medicare. The critical political maneuver in the Medicare debate was 
limiting the discussion to health care for the elderly. The evidence suggesting 
poorer access to health care for the elderly than for other age groups was diffi- 
cult to dispute, and by focusing the program, objections from the AMA that 
this would lead to government control of doctors was blunted. Representative 
Wilbur Mills combined a Democratic proposal for mandatory hospital insur- 
ance (Medicare Part A) with a Republican proposal for a voluntary outpatient 
and physician care program  (Medicare Part B) and produced legislation that 
was supported by a majority of Congress. 
The critical element in the debate leading to Medicare was a distributional 
concern with access to health care among specific groups. On this dimension, 
Medicare achieved its objectives. Davis and Schoen (1978) present some evi- 
dence that the ratio of physician visits per year by those in high-income  and 
low-income categories was more equal in  1975 than in  1964, before the pas- 301  Government Intervention in Markets for Education and Health Care 
sage of Medicare and Medicaid. The effect was less pronounced for the elderly 
than for younger groups. 
To summarize this section, it is difficult to explain either the present struc- 
ture of  public involvement in education in the United States, or the historical 
evolution of the public sector’s involvement, using either externality or redis- 
tributive arguments. Redistributive concerns do appear to play a greater role in 
defining government policy toward medical care. Concern about market imper- 
fections  in the medical marketplace does not appear to have played  an im- 
portant role in the rise of publicly financed medical care in the United States. 
10.5  The Research Agenda 
The questions of whether particular markets may exhibit imperfections, and 
whether redistribution could in principle be carried out, receive far more dis- 
cussion among economists than the questions of  whether markets are actually 
imperfect, whether  government  intervention  in  these  markets  improves  or 
worsens matters, and whether various redistributive programs are acrually suc- 
cessful. Yet the choice among various policies for government intervention de- 
pends on the actual performance of such policies. This concluding section out- 
lines several areas where further research will yield high returns in informing 
the debate on choice of public policies in the fields of education and health 
care. 
First,  because externalities  are invoked  to justify intervention  in both of 
these markets, there is a pressing need to document the magnitude of the exter- 
nalities, particularly those associated with consumption of education. It is im- 
portant in this regard to assess whether the generation of externalities changes 
as the level of consumption changes, that is, whether primary and secondary 
education yields larger or smaller externalities than higher education. If most 
externalities are generated by levels of educational input that individuals would 
choose to obtain without government subsidy, then the case for public interven- 
tion in the educational marketplace may be much weaker than is commonly 
believed. More generally, there is a need to quantify the importance of various 
imperfections that are listed as potential problems with the markets for educa- 
tion and health care, and to move beyond the discussion of reasons that might 
justify public intervention to reasons that do or do not. 
Second, the efficiency of public providers of services, as opposed to that of 
private-sector providers, requires further attention, since this is a key determi- 
nant of whether governments should make or buy services. The range of orga- 
nizational forms in the medical care sector-private  hospitals, nonprofit hospi- 
tals, and state- and federal-government-run  hospitals-provides  a wealth of 
data for comparing input choices and productivity. While many studies of pub- 
lic versus private production conclude that the public sector is a less efficient 
producer of various goods and services, these studies are often contaminated 
by various selection biases in the set of services provided by the government. 
Zeckhauser ( 1986) argues that in higher education, public institutions tend to 302  James M. Poterba 
function more like their nonprofit competitors than like other government bu- 
reaucracies. Further evidence on this issue for primary and secondary educa- 
tion, and for hospitals, would be valuable. 
A third important issue, involving political economy as well as the micro- 
economic analysis of government policy, concerns the basis of political support 
for redistributive policies toward children and the elderly. Spending on educa- 
tion represents redistribution to the young; spending on health care and health 
insurance transfers resources  to the elderly. A number of commentators, in- 
cluding Preston (1984) and Kotlikoff  and Gokhale (1993), have called atten- 
tion  to the rapid growth  of transfers to the elderly, and the relative  decline 
in society’s investment in children.*O  This may reflect more effective political 
activities of elderly voters than those who are concerned with children, or it 
may reflect the fact that more middle-aged households are childless than with- 
out living parents. It is also possible that most middle-aged individuals know 
that they can expect to live well into their seventies and eighties, and to benefit 
from generous policies toward the elderly that are enacted today. These factors 
may explain the political reality of growing redistribution  toward the elderly 
rather than toward children. 
The current policy debates in both education and health care, including the 
discussions of school vouchers, increased state financing of schools, and a fed- 
eral mandate for health insurance, suggest that the nature of government inter- 
vention  in  these markets  is  subject to continuing evaluation  and potential 
change. This underscores the need for further investigation of both the argu- 
ments for government intervention in these areas, and the merits and demerits 
of alternative instruments for market intervention. 
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Comment  Richard J. Zeckhauser 
The government’s actions on health and on schools, 
Have little to do with economists’ rules. 
How should the government intervene in the economy? This is a central ques- 
tion for economics, be it Marxian or classical, liberal or conservative. Social 
policy-which  includes the child care, elderly long-term care, education, and 
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health programs explored in this volume-offers  fertile soil for the economist. 
Each year, dozens of dissertations and hundreds of articles attest to econo- 
mists’ abilities to identify market failures as the justification for social pro- 
grams. 
In his essay, James  Poterba  examines whether economics can effectively 
explain government’s choice of  instruments-subsidies,  mandates, or direct 
provision-in  intervening in markets for education and health care. He con- 
cludes, quite appropriately, that economics simply does not explain why the 
government so often directly provides education, yet relies on subsidies as its 
principal intervention in health care. 
Poterba is best known for his carefully crafted empirical studies. Though 
studded with facts, this essay more reflects than distills, since “there is virtually 
no  evidence on  the  empirical magnitudes  of  many  of  the  key  parameters 
needed to guide policy in these areas.” Poterba provides a state-of-the-art over- 
view of the rationales for alternative forms of  intervention, and an insightful 
description of actual interventions in the health and education markets. 
In his concluding pages, he turns to define a research agenda: he justifiably 
scolds economists for spending far too much time worrying whether markets 
may fail and whether interventions might work, and far too little time determin- 
ing whether failures are significant or government programs successful. Then 
he briefly raises the flag of positive political economy, suggesting that political 
forces, more than economic logic, may explain the patterns of  redistributive 
government  interventions  we  observe. (For example, a population  that has 
more voters with parents than with young children tips generosity toward el- 
ders and away from kids.) 
The Problem and Puzzles 
Social policy borrows the metaphors of  and an occasional empirical fact 
from economics, but  otherwise ignores it.  Economics, oblivious to  reality, 
spins theories of how social policy should organize itself. It is no surprise that 
economics, notably the central tools of public  finance, do not explain  how 
governments actually intervene. Even if they did, economists, much less policy 
makers, rarely have sufficient information to know what magnitude of inter- 
vention is justified. 
Economists’ advice is mostly ignored on social policy issues. (Witness the 
dramatic shift in social policy thinking, despite no change in the underlying 
economics, with the election of a Republican Congress.) The concepts of eco- 
nomics at best serve as metaphors.  Economic considerations do not explain 
government decisions on social policy. To illustrate: 
Why do we have direct medical provision for veterans, but not for people 
who are poor (Medicaid) or old (Medicare)? 
Why did we use vouchers, not direct provision, for the GIs’ education? 306  James M. Poterba 
Why is  there so little direct  government  provision  of  care in  nursing 
homes and child  care, as compared to  primary  and secondary edu- 
cation? 
Why does Massachusetts, an extremely liberal jurisdiction traditionally, 
have so little public higher education? 
Why does Chicago have one public hospital, and New York many? 
Using economics as the basis, the answer to any such question would be 
tortured, because there is sure to be another empirical scenario where nearly 
identical economic circumstances led to a quite different outcome, suggesting 
that the theory of  market failure tells us little. Witness the United States and 
Canada on health care. 
Fully informed answers to these questions, I believe, are idiosyncratic. Acci- 
dents of history, or hard work by political players-consider  the insurance in- 
dustry and health care reform-explain  far more than the presence of an exter- 
nality, or a substantially impeded information flow. 
Poterba  examines  whether a concern for redistribution  can justify policy. 
Redistribution can easily be thought of as a public good, thereby lending itself 
to a market failure justification for intervention. However, it does not explain 
the policy patterns we observe. If it did, the United States, with its relatively 
uneven  income distribution,  would  have  a  bigger  government  sector than 
Sweden. 
The only explanation for our haphazard pattern of social policy that is con- 
sistent with economics is that the optimum is broad; for example, it doesn’t 
really matter whether the government or the private sector provides health care 
to veterans. Few observers, economic or otherwise, believe this. Sometimes 
we directly observe factors that lead to haphazard outcomes. For example, the 
Clinton health plan would have transformed  one-seventh of our economy; it 
would have been the public finance-social  policy example of the decade. In 
retrospect, the policy  did not come close. Few health care expert-beyond 
our editor, who had already put his chips down in print-would  have bet three 
to one against it a year before it failed. So, in the policy equivalent of chaos 
theory, we find that starting in nearly identical circumstances we can get dra- 
matically different outcomes. It hardly makes sense after the fact to go back 
and find the clear economic factors that show why we ended where we did. 
Those factors hardly changed-what  mattered were people’s views of Clinton 
and his political strategy. 
Uncle Joe and “Aha, the Externality” 
A great  strength  and weakness  of economics is that it finds its concepts 
everywhere. Just as Aunt Martha always sees her beloved Uncle Joe in each 
new niece and nephew, so economists can find concentrated markets, inade- 
quate information  flows, and externalities  whenever they look into a policy 
context. The danger is the “Aha, the Externality” syndrome: we find a market 307  Government Intervention in Markets for Education and Health Care 
failure and discuss how to intervene. What is missing is any concept of the 
externality’s magnitude, or much thought about how alternative measures, in- 
cluding doing nothing, would perform. 
It is no surprise that with substantial support from economists, we have doz- 
ens of in-kind programs to support poor people that in sum dwarf cash assis- 
tance in their magnitude. Such programs, alas, make it virtually impossible to 
bring about welfare reform offering strong incentives to work. 
The Policy Loss 
The failure of economics to describe suggests that our policies are far from 
optimal. Ruling out the Pollyannaish view that there is a broad optimum-for 
example, it does not matter whether the government or private sector produces, 
or a child care subsidy of $1,000 is about as good as one of $500-the  design 
of policies is substantially in error. Good A is subsidized too much, B too little, 
and neither is produced in near the right quantity by the right party. 
Poterba tells the moral right: Do the empirical analysis. Document the mag- 
nitude of the market failure, and assess the performance of any program that 
confronts it. 
I would  add that you should not be trapped  by the lure of the lamppost: 
economic methods may shine most brightly where current policies are most 
reasonable. Where these methods are hardest to apply, as, say, when formulat- 
ing policy to deal with the breakdown of the family, is where they may contnb- 
Ute the most. 
Concluding Thoughts 
Chess masters can instantaneously memorize a pattern from actual play, but 
are just like the rest of us if  some pieces are placed at random. Economists 
looking at social policy are like chess masters looking at random boards: the 
patterns make little sense, and it is hard to see what reasonable pattern of play 
could have led to what we observe. 
The social policy game is hardly random, but neither is it driven primarily 
by the concepts that economists discuss. Economists need an improved knowl- 
edge of  the real game, including both empirical realities and matters of institu- 
tional design and politics. With such knowledge, economists can speak more 
meaningfully, and help push our haphazard social policies in desirable direc- 
tions. This Page Intentionally Left Blank